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This article begins with an overview of the fourfold epistemological framework that arises out of 
Kant’s distinctions between analyticity and syntheticity and between apriority and aposteriority. I 
challenge Kant’s claim that the fourth classification, analytic aposteriority, is empty. In reviewing 
three articles written during the third quarter of the twentieth century that also defend analytic 
aposteriority, I identify promising insights suggested by Benardete (1958). I then present overviews of 
two 1987 articles wherein I defend analytic aposteriority, first as a classification highlighting the 
epistemological status of several crucial (and easily misunderstood) features of Kant’s own 
philosophy, and second as a way of expressing some of Kripke’s claims about naming in more 
authentically Kantian terminology. The paper concludes with suggestions of several other important 
philosophical developments that also make advances precisely insofar as they expound the nature and 
implications of the epistemological classification that Kant assumed to be empty. 
 
 
1. The Boundary of Knowledge: Kant’s Framework of Epistemological Classifications 
 One of the central features of Kant’s ground-breaking Critique of Pure Reason is its 
introduction of a new framework for classifying propositions according to their epistemological 
status, based on two dyadic distinctions: first, between propositions that evince an “analytic” 
structure and those with a “synthetic” structure; and second, between “a priori” modes of justifying 
such propositions and “a posteriori” modes.1 This gives rise to four possible kinds of propositional 
knowledge-claim, two of which are relatively non-controversial: analytic a priori propositions 
establish logical knowledge, whereas synthetic a posteriori propositions establish empirical 
knowledge. As is well known, Kant used one of the two controversial types to demonstrate why 
Hume’s distinction between “matters of fact” (cf. synthetic a posteriori propositions) and “matters 
of reason” (cf. analytic a priori propositions) does not encompass all possible options. In rejecting 
the legitimacy of the law of causality, Hume had failed to notice that some (albeit, rare) 
propositions exhibit a synthetic (factual) structure, yet can be justified through an entirely a priori 
mode of argument. 
 Kant’s own way of defining this fourfold distinction has been examined by so many past 
commentators that a thoroughgoing overview of its various nuances would require a book length 
work. Instead of scrutinizing the interpretive history of this distinction, I shall offer an outline of 
what are widely accepted to be Kant’s basic parameters for understanding each relevant term. 
Throughout this discussion we must keep in mind that, once again, the first pair of terms refers to 
the structure of propositions, whereas the second pair refers to their justification. A neglect of this 
difference has given rise to misleading portrayals of synthetic apriority in particular.
2
 However, we 
need not examine those departures from Kant’s approach here, as our interest lies elsewhere. 
 Kant argued that the structure of a proposition must be such that either its predicate is 
contained within the subject and is therefore self-evident or its predicate lies outside the subject, so 
that we must appeal to something else in order to ascertain its truth. Propositions of the former type 
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(e.g., “White is a color”) are analytic because we can derive the predicate merely through a logical 
analysis of the subject; they are not informative, for they tell us only what we already know, 
assuming we understand the meaning of the words being used. (If I merely say “white”, anyone 
who understands the word would be likely to assume I am referring to a color, especially if we are 
in the presence of something white and the listener knows I am referring to that thing). Propositions 
of the latter type (e.g., “This paper is white”) are synthetic because we must appeal beyond the 
concepts themselves, to what Kant called “intuitions” (or sensible input), in order to ascertain their 
truth; such propositions are informative, inasmuch as they tell us about some factual state of affairs. 
Whereas typical examples of analytic propositions carry with them (as in a deduction) a form of 
conceptual truth that is necessary, typical examples of synthetic propositions advance claims (as in 
an induction) that are contingent and therefore might cease to be true, if the facts happen to change. 
(The paper these words are printed on might have faded into a pale yellow—or for that matter, they 
might now be appearing on a computer monitor, perhaps with a light blue background). 
 The second distinction, between a priori and a posteriori modes of justification, seems at 
first to be coextensive with the first pair, but Kant insists their ranges of application are distinct. A 
proposition is a priori if we do not need to appeal to any particular experience to justify its truth, 
whereas establishing the truth of an a posteriori proposition requires such an appeal. Obviously, the 
above examples of analytic and synthetic propositions would also be a priori and a posteriori, 
respectively, since those examples illustrate the two uncontroversial members of the fourfold 
distinction. Yet Kant argues that a previously-neglected alternative, the synthetic a priori, is not 
only possible but constitutes the epistemological status of the most significant truth-claims in all of 
philosophy. His most famous example, the proposition “Everything that happens has its cause” 
(CPR B13), is (not coincidentally) the very principle that Hume had downplayed as a groundless 
“habit” of thought. In Kant’s hands, it becomes a necessary condition (hence, a priori) for all 
experience of objects (hence, synthetic). Because the appeal here is to experience in general, not to 
any particular experience, Kant famously argued that such affirmations of “transcendental” 
knowledge have the status of absolute (apodictic) certainty: they define the very boundary-
conditions that make empirical knowledge possible. 
In discussing the key features of this epistemological framework, Kant notes in passing that 
one of the four logically possible classifications that arises out of this fourfold distinction is simply 
empty (CPR B11): “Experientia1 judgments, as such, are one and all synthetic. For to base an 
analytic judgment on experience would be absurd, because in its case I can formulate my judgment 
without going outside my concept, and hence do not need for it any testimony of experience.” Aside 
from this lone, off-hand comment, Kant never considers the possibility that this fourth type of 
proposition might describe a legitimate area of philosophical inquiry. At first sight, he appears to 
have been correct to rule out the possibility of analytic aposteriority, for if we must appeal to 
experience in order to justify the truth of a given proposition, how can its truth be grounded entirely 
in the concepts? Indeed, if we judge from the extensive secondary literature on this question, then 
Kant was right. For out of the thousands of scholars who have commented on aspects of this 
distinction over the past two centuries, only a handful have explicitly questioned Kant’s rejection of 
this elusive fourth classification. 
Despite the almost deafening lack of attention that has been given to the possibility of 
locating meaningful analytic a posteriori truth-claims, I have previously argued that some of the 
most interesting features of Kant’s own philosophical system, as well as some of the most 
important advances made by twentieth-century philosophy, can be regarded as a direct outworking 
of precisely this (admittedly paradoxical) classification. Having offered in this opening section a 
brief introduction to Kant’s definitions of the key terms, I shall proceed in §2 to discuss three initial 
attempts that were made during the third quarter of the twentieth century to rescue analytic 
aposteriority from Kant’s charge of emptiness. While two of those early attempts are of little help, 
because they were based on misunderstandings of Kant’s original distinction, the other one presents 
arguments that foreshadow the position I shall defend here, though in a somewhat different way. In 





 that analytic aposteriority is actually a crucial epistemological classification for 
philosophers to consider, both for a complete understanding of Kant’s own philosophical system 
and for an accurate assessment (within a Kantian framework) of why various contemporary 
developments in philosophy are so significant. Finally, in §4 I will survey several twentieth-century 
applications of this elusive classification, arguing that some of the greatest philosophical 
achievements in recent decades can actually be understood more deeply if they are interpreted as 
examples of analytic aposteriority. 
 
2. Some Early Attempts to Restore Kant’s Suppressed Fourth Classification 
 Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, especially in the wake of Quine’s 
influential critique [7], the analytic-synthetic distinction fell into considerable disrepute, especially 
among philosophers in the (somewhat ironically named) “analytic” tradition.4 Doubts about the 
notion of a priori knowledge were quick to follow.
5
 As a result, many philosophers to this day 
consider the status of so many propositions to be difficult if not impossible to pin down as either 
analytic or synthetic, and the whole notion of apriority to be so counter-intuitive, that the Kantian 
framework tends to be discarded as altogether worthless. To counter such objections, I have argued 
(in “APK”) that the “gray areas” that apply to most (if not all) examples of real-life propositions 
cause problems for the Kantian framework only when the four key terms are used in ways that 
diverge from Kant’s guidelines, or when we fail to consider a proposition’s context. What I call a 
“perspectival” interpretation of Kant’s epistemological framework maintains that any given 
proposition might, in principle, take on any of the four possible classifications, depending on its 
use. But before explaining (in §4) how this works as a defense against Quine’s critique and how it 
highlights what is arguably the central error of Kant’s philosophical system, let us examine other, 
earlier attempts to justify the claim that analytic aposteriority may be a meaningful epistemological 
classification for some types of proposition. 
 In this section I shall examine three independent attempts, during the third quarter of the 
twentieth century, to resurrect the notion of analytic aposteriority from the graveyard of 
implausibility to which Kant consigned it. I have been unable to locate any response or even 
citation to any of the three articles to be discussed here, so there is no need to present them in 
chronological order. Instead, I shall begin with the least substantive and most problematic article 
and progress to the one that most successfully explains how and why the analytic a posteriori has a 
proper place not only in epistemology, but in metaphysics as well. 
 Virgil Aldrich’s attempt to awaken Kantians from the “dogmatic slumber” of merely 
assuming that analytic aposteriority is self-contradictory [1] consists of a short and comparatively 
simple argument. What “has kept viable the dogma of there being no analytic a posteriori 
propositions”, he claims, is the assumption that analytic containment must be conceptual (200). He 
correctly observes that many ordinary propositions are uttered while the speaker is in direct 
perceptual contact with the subject of the proposition (e.g., “This paper is white”—if you are now 
actually reading this article printed on white paper). If such perceptual containment counts as 
analytic just as much as conceptual containment does, then it is a short step to the conclusion that 
analytic a posteriori concepts are commonplace. After all, one must obviously experience the paper 
(look at it) in order to recognize that the white percept is contained in the paper (201). 
Unfortunately, this argument draws its entire force from a complete neglect of the crucial fact that 
for Kant any such requirement that we appeal to a percept (i.e., to what Kant calls an “intuition”) 
makes the proposition synthetic. All of the propositions Aldrich thinks he has demonstrated to be 
analytic a posteriori would therefore, given Kant’s definitions, merely be examples of the least 
controversial of all the classifications: the synthetic aposteriority of ordinary empirical knowledge. 
In order to be analytic a posteriori on Kant’s definitions of the terms (see §1), the knowledge that 
the paper is white could not come from the percept, but would have to be attached necessarily to the 
subject of the proposition in a completely conceptual manner. This is not just a dogmatic 
assumption; it is a crucial defining feature of the fourfold distinction that cannot be amended 
without radically changing the nature of what is being claimed. 
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 D. Goldstick’s attempt to make sense out of Kant’s rejected epistemological classification 
[4] is only slightly longer and slightly more informative than Aldrich’s. Fortunately, the 
misunderstanding that plagues its argument is not so serious. Correctly insisting that “the term 
‘analytic’ ought not be understood as equivalent to ‘provable by unaided logical deduction’” (531), 
Goldstick’s aim is “to justify the reasonableness of asserting the probable existence of some 
analytic a posteriori truths” (534, my emphasis). His ensuing argument rests on a rather curious 
strategy. First, he lists four propositions that each express potentially analytic a posteriori truth, 
because each starts with: “It is logically possible that [or for]…” (532). He then defends the key 
claim, that “all truths which assert the existence of logical possibilities” are analytic (533), with two 
reasons: (A) whatever determines logical necessity must also determine what lacks logical 
necessity, and negating the latter “determines also which [propositions] are logically possible” 
(533); and (B) “logically necessary” is equivalent to “true in all logically possible worlds”, so 
anything that is actually (i.e., in our world) logically possible will be logically possible in all 
logically possible worlds (533). The only issue that remains, then, is whether “belief in the 
existence of a logical possibility may sometimes be rationally founded” (534). Goldstick defends 
the probability that some analytic a posteriori truths exist by citing three factors that would ground 
the rationality of such a belief (534): (i) “the existence of a logically valid deductive proof” that has 
as its conclusion either that some proposition is logically possible or that its negation cannot be 
logically deduced; (ii) “the existence of empirical evidence” that “no logically valid deductive proof 
has to date been found for the [latter] negation”; and (iii) “the existence…of [real] empirical 
evidence for the actual truth of the [former] proposition”—all quite plausible claims. While 
Goldstick presents an ingenious argument, his conclusion’s appeal to probability renders it too weak 
to be applicable to a Kantian framework, where apodictic certainty is the ultimate goal. Moreover, 
he never clearly explains the crucial distinction between analytic aposteriority and the far less 
controversial type of logical truth, analytic apriority, thus giving rise to the suspicion that he has 
actually been dealing with probabilities of the latter type all along. 
By far the most substantive of the three early attempts to restore credibility to the analytic a 
posteriori was the first, an article by José Benardete [2], who writes (503): 
It is our present object to show that there are in fact analytic truths which are derived from a 
precise examination of experience, that these truths must be understood as a posteriori rather 
than as a priori, and that they are material, rather than merely formal, in their content. In 
establishing the analytic a posteriori, we seek to provide a kind of organon propaedeutic to 
metaphysics itself. 
Benardete goes so far as to claim that, if he is correct, then “[t]he logical question preliminary to 
metaphysics” must be expressed in precisely the “obverse fashion” (504) of the way Kant expressed 
it—namely, as “how is the analytic a posteriori possible?” In support of this claim, Benardete 
appeals to two crucial aspects of our empirical knowledge of the external world, sight and sound, 
focusing most of his attention on the latter.
6
 
 Concerning sound, Benardete asks us to consider three basic components of any sound 
(especially noticeable in an analysis of music): pitch, timbre, and loudness (504-505). These basic 
components seem to be essentially different from other, more specific characteristics of a sound, 
such as its “middle-C-ness”. With Kant’s definition of analyticity as containment in mind, 
Benardete then argues (505-506): 
In general, whenever the predicate of a non-identical analytic proposition cannot be 
subtracted from the subject so as to leave a residue, or if, in some sense, it can be subtracted 
(as loudness from middle-C-ness) but the residue itself entails that predicate, then we are 
confronted with a real, and not a nominal, analytic proposition. By means of this method of 
subtraction, we are equipped with a touchstone or canon by which to certify the analytic a 
posteriori. 
A nominal analytic proposition would be a priori: justifiable with reference to nothing more than 
the meanings of the words. But in the type of proposition Benardete has in mind, where the subject 
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is “middle-C-ness”, we would have no idea that this subject requires or contains some degree of 
loudness, except by examining the way the empirical world works. 
As another example Benardete mentions Hume’s discussion of the hypothetical discovery of 
a new shade of blue, then asks: “How do we know of this missing shade? By experience? 
Certainly.”7 The proposition that this new shade of blue is a color is just as analytic as the 
proposition “White is a color”, yet the only way to discover (and thus, to justify) the truth of the 
proposition that this new shade is blue is through experience. We shall return to this point in §4, 
when we see how similar arguments were advanced by subsequent twentieth-century philosophers. 
For now it will suffice to note that Benardete’s argument rests on the claim that definition can 
operate in two distinct ways: as either synthetic or analytic. Thus, comparing sound and color, he 
distinguishes between these two senses of defining a term or determining a percept (511-512): 
The simple sound itself must be described or defined in terms of a definite loudness and 
timbre as well as a definite pitch; just as the simple color “emerald” must be defined…as 
yellow-green in hue, of medium saturation, and medium brightness. It has long been 
fashionable to assume that simple sensations are indefinable. This is quite false…. It is a 
grave error to look for the indefinables in the names of simple sensations…. Just as no such 
thing as a bare animal can exist, unspecified as to its being canine, feline, or some other; so, 
too, a bare hue, which is not some definite hue, cannot exist…. The attributes of a simple 
sound cannot be dismissed as merely nothing at all. They exist in their own derivative way, 
as modes. At bottom, there is a certain indeterminacy (or synthetic quality) in simple 
impressions, as well as a definite determinacy (or analytic quality.) 
The status of propositions that are a posteriori, because their justification requires an appeal to 
something perceived through our five senses, reflects this two-sided situation: if the a posteriori 
aspect cannot be determined or defined without going beyond the subject-concept to the direct 
experience of what the predicate describes, then it is the ordinary, synthetic variety; if we can 
determine or define the applicability of the predicate as being already contained in the subject-
concept, due to the type of experience under consideration (e.g., due to the way sounds or colors 
operate), then those claims (e.g., “Every sound has a pitch” or “Every color has a hue”) are analytic 
even though they, too, are knowable only a posteriori.
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Perhaps one of the main reasons Benardete’s insightful arguments fell on rocky soil, at this 
point in the development of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy, is that, as he openly 
admits, this way of understanding the nature of color and sound would “oblige us to return to a 
doctrine of real essences” (512)—a metaphysical assumption that was widely discredited at the 
time.
9
 Nearly all of the facts we learn, when we experience percepts such as colors or sounds, will 
still count as empirical (i.e., synthetic a posteriori), if we accept Benardete’s argument; but the 
discovery that every experience of color necessarily “possesses the properties of hue, brightness, 
saturation, figure, and magnitude” (512) must be recognized as analytic a posteriori; for “these latter 
properties, unlike the former, do exist in a substantial unity, an intelligible necessary connection 
binding them all together. It is that necessary connection which provides the metaphysical ground 
for the logical concept of the analytic a posteriori.” 
 The general rule for determining the epistemological status of a proposition, on Benardete’s 
view, is to ask, for any proposition that is not a tautology (513), 
can the predicate be subtracted from the subject so as to yield a residue, as the predicate 
“wicked” of the analytic proposition “all ogres are wicked” can be subtracted from the 
subject “ogre” to yield the residue “giant.” If that subtraction cannot be performed, then the 
proposition is analytic a posteriori. 
In order to appreciate the full force of Benardete’s conclusion, we must consider the other three 
options that he here leaves unspecified, perhaps because he thought they were too obvious. First, he 
must be assuming (unproblematically) that tautologies, or nominally analytic propositions (such as 
“White is a color”), are analytic a priori. What is rather curious is that he says nothing about the 
status of a proposition for which such a subtraction can be performed, but with a residue, as in the 
very example he provides. His choice of example suggests, though, that he is assuming that such 
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propositions are also analytic a priori, for his example follows the same structure as the standard 
example of an analytic proposition, “All bachelors are unmarried”, where subtracting “unmarried” 
yields the residue “man”. If, instead of canceling out the subject altogether or changing it 
significantly, the subtraction of the predicate leaves the subject (as such) essentially unchanged, 
then the proposition is (by definition) synthetic: subtract “white” from “paper” in “This paper is 
white”, and nothing essential to the subject actually changes. Presumably, Kant would say the same 
about subtracting “cause and effect” from “changes” in the archetypal synthetic a priori proposition, 
“All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect” (CPR A/B232). 
Once we see how the three main options in Kant’s epistemological framework fit in with 
Benardete’s “subtraction” procedure, we can appreciate the force of his claim that, if such a 
subtraction cannot be performed in a given proposition, then that proposition is analytic a posteriori. 
The three other classifications are all expressed in terms of predicates that can be subtracted from 
their subjects, either not changing the subject in any essential way (and thus, synthetic) or else 
changing it essentially (and thus, analytic). Benardete’s claim is that some propositions cannot be 
subjected to this procedure, and these are the ones Kant left unaccounted for by treating the fourth 
classification as empty. Surprisingly, Benardete never provides an actual example of a specific 
analytic a posteriori proposition; but from his argument, we may assume that he had in mind the 
two proposed above: “Every sound has a pitch” and “Every color has a hue.” In each case, the 
predicate designates a feature of the subject that, through experience alone, we recognize as 
contained within the concept of the subject. As we shall see in §4, this focus on what Kripke later 
called rigid designation, came to be the basis for what was arguably the most important application 
of analytic aposteriority in the twentieth century. But before we assess such recent applications, let 
us take a step back and examine what happens to Kant’s own philosophy, if we allow analytic 
aposteriority to have its proper place. 
 
3. The Need for Analytic Aposteriority in Kant’s Philosophy 
 Once the analytic a posteriori is recognized as a non-empty member of Kant’s 
epistemological framework, the question arises as to whether or not Kant’s own philosophy 
contains propositions with such a status, propositions that would in that case tend to seem out of 
place or ill-defined as Kant presents them. My earliest work on this topic defends just such a claim, 
that the architectonic unity of Kant’s own system cannot be fully appreciated apart from an 
awareness of the role played by the analytic a posteriori.
10
 In this section I shall therefore present a 
summary and further elaboration of that initial application. While I first located analytic 
aposteriority only in the Dialectic of the first Critique and in the Analytic of second, I shall here 
suggest that it also plays a crucial role in the theory of symbolism defended in the third Critique and 
applied in Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. 
In the Dialectic of CPR, Kant develops some of the most elaborate and influential arguments 
in his entire corpus, demonstrating that propositions formerly believed to convey genuine 
metaphysical truth (and therefore serving as prime candidates for the classification he had earlier 
introduced as being synthetic a priori) are at best inconclusive, and at worst, vacuous. Having 
completed his demonstration that traditional (“speculative”) metaphysics provides no valid 
synthetic a priori propositions,
11
 he concludes the Dialectic with a lengthy Appendix, arguing that 
the same ideas of reason that fail to attain a synthetic a priori status (i.e., God, freedom, and 
immortality) nevertheless have a legitimate function in metaphysics, as regulative (rather than 
constitutive) principles, guiding our search for unity in the systematic ordering of human 
knowledge. He is careful to caution that, when we view an idea of reason in this way, we are acting 
as if it is true, rather than justifying its truth as a confirmed item of knowledge as such. Later, in 
Chapter I of CPR’s Doctrine of Method, Kant also discusses the role of hypotheses in reason’s 
proper metaphysical employment: philosophers may rightly use hypotheses “as weapons of war” 
(CPR A777/B805), even though we must treat the concepts they affirm as beliefs rather than as 
objectively confirmed knowledge. 
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The single most problematic feature of these affirmations of a more promising approach to 
metachysics, both in the Dialectic and in the Doctrine of Method, is that, having demonstrated that 
metaphysics contains no synthetic a priori knowledge, Kant never assigns any epistemological 
status to the crucial counterweight to his rejection of traditional metaphysics. The claim in my early 
work on this aspect of Kant philosophy (see note 10) was that Kant’s whole discussion of the 
regulative ideas of reason would have been far more convincing, its overall role in the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements would have been more clear, and its intimate connection with 
the use of hypothetical (belief-centered) reasoning more evident, had he presented his new path to 
metaphysics as one that treats the ideas of reason as analytic a posteriori truth-claims. Assigning a 
distinct epistemological classification to his new approach would have clearly set Kant’s response 
to Hume (i.e., his defense of the principle of causality) apart from his main (and quite different) 
project of elaborating a moral approach to metaphysics. 
 What does it mean to assign an analytic a posteriori status to Kant’s attempts to rescue the 
ideas of reason from ultimate meaninglessness? Claiming that a metaphysical proposition that uses 
a concept of reason (i.e., an idea), such as “God”, is analytic means precisely what Kant argues 
throughout the Dialectic, regarding each of the three ideas: first, we cannot have any intuition of the 
object that such a concept (presumably) refers to; rather, “the hypothetical use of reason aims at the 
systematic unity of the cognitions of understanding” through the pure concept of totality, thus 
producing a conceptual “unity” that “is the touchstone of the truth of the understanding’s rules” 
(CPR A647/B675). Assigning an a posteriori status to this use of reason means that we can know 
nothing about how to justify propositions about God, freedom (or the universe as a whole), and 
immortality (or the soul), apart from treating them as if they shed light on some specific 
experience(s) that the propositions refer to or imply. (This, for example, is why Kant regards the 
physico-theological—i.e, the teleological—argument for God’s existence as being far more 
effective than the ontological or cosmological arguments.) Kant sometimes comes so close to 
stating precisely these features of reason’s use of ideas that it is quite remarkable that he failed to 
recognize their analytic a posteriori status. He says at one point (A311/B367), for instance, that 
“although no actual experience ever fully attains to that cognition [conveyed by a “concept of 
reason”], yet any actual experience always belongs to such a cognition.” That experience “(perhaps 
even the whole of possible experience or of its empirical synthesis)” is part and parcel of every idea 
(i.e., every concept of reason) makes it a posteriori. Yet we cannot actually experience the object 
referred to by that concept, as such; the most we can do is to become aware that all our experiences 
“belong to” or are contained within that idea, thus making it analytic. 
Given Kant’s own explicit appeal in the Doctrine of Method to the crucial role played by 
hypotheses in this way of thinking, I have proposed the convention of referring to reflection that 
aims at establishing analytic a posteriori truth as adopting the hypothetical perspective. Just as 
synthetic apriority defines the transcendental perspective that establishes the fundamental 
boundary-conditions for all the synthetic a posteriori knowledge that we generate from the 
empirical perspective, so also the analytic aposteriority of the hypothetical perspective establishes 
the fundamental parameters for all the analytic a priori truth that we verify from the logical 
perspective. The difference between the hypothetical and logical perspectives is that the latter 
presents us with a completed whole that can be grasped without experiencing it, whereas the former, 
with its appeal to the containment of experience within a pure concept (i.e., an idea), always 
presents us with a task to be completed—a theme that pervades both the Dialectic and the Doctrine 
of Method and explains why the hypothetical perspective leads naturally to the practical standpoint. 
 Within CPR’s Doctrine of Method, Kant explains that, although this hypothetical 
perspective (i.e., the mode of reflection that he should have identified as having an analytic a 
posteriori status) is problematic when assessed from the theoretical standpoint, it nevertheless gives 
rise to an entirely appropriate application, from the practical (or moral) standpoint. The crucial 
connection between the hypothetical perspective of theoretical reason and reason’s practical 
standpoint is obscured, as I have argued in KSP 132-137, by the fact that Kant portrays moral 
metaphysics as somehow providing reason with synthetic a priori principles, even though the 
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theoretical Critique had proved this to be impossible. My perspectival interpretation of Kant’s 
Critical System shows that each Critique is based on a distinct standpoint and that each of these 
standpoints is formed by focusing on one of the four perspectives that guide the development of the 
argument within each Critique (i.e., the transcendental, logical, empirical, and hypothetical 
perspectives, respectively). What is being critiqued in CPR is the attempt to use the understanding 
alone (i.e., the analytic apriority of the logical perspective) to solve problems that go beyond the 
realm that is the understanding’s true home (i.e., the synthetic aposteriority of the empirical 
perspective) and in so doing to draw (alleged) inferences about the nature of reality as such (i.e., the 
analytic aposteriority of the hypothetical perspective). 
In the second Critique the focus changes: whereas the theoretical standpoint takes the 
understanding (especially in its logical, analytic a priori employment) as its defining perspective, 
the practical standpoint takes reason (in its hypothetical employment) as its defining perspective. 
Only within the context of this radical change of standpoint (such that the analytic a posteriori—in 
this case, the idea of freedom—is no longer the conclusion, but the starting-point of the inquiry) can 
practical reason’s search for (practically!) synthetic a priori principles be understood. Interestingly, 
when Kant distinguishes action in nature (i.e., as viewed from the empirical perspective) from 
moral action, he says “this ought expresses a possible action whose basis is nothing but a mere 
concept” (CPR A547/B575); that is, morality occurs when we hypothetically view our experience (a 
posteriori) as contained in a concept such as “good”. Taken in this way, we can regard Kant’s 
overall moral philosophy as a defense of the analytic aposteriority of freedom.
12
 Morality for Kant 
just is the adoption of a concept as a hypothesis that a person then imposes onto his or her 
experience in such a way that experience conforms itself to the concept, rather than vice versa. This 
is the essence of the Kantian analytic a posteriori as it appears in his Critiques, though without 
being named. 
 Recognizing the crucial role of the analytic a posteriori in Kantian (moral) metaphysics 
brings added focus and clarity not only to the intricacies of his moral philosophy as such, but also to 
his use of the moral themes in various other applications, such as to the areas of aesthetics and 
religion. Without going into detail here, I shall mention just one example that relates to both of 
these areas. Kant’s portrayal of beauty as a symbol of morality13 makes little (or no) sense if we 
regard it as an expression of any of the three epistemological classifications that Kant explicitly 
recognizes (i.e., analytic apriority, synthetic apriority, and synthetic aposteriority). Kant himself 
clearly distinguishes the use of symbols to elucidate ideas that have no intuitive instantiation from 
the use of schemata to elucidate concepts that can be directly manifested in intuition. Only the latter 
would count as synthetic a posteriori judgments that are grounded in synthetic a priori principles, 
thus justifying a person in claiming to express objective knowledge through propositions that relate 
given intuitions to their conceptual features. The function of symbolism, according to Kant, is 
precisely to fill the gap left by the inadequacy of the three well-established epistemological 
classifications. When employing a symbol, we employ the faculty of imagination to interpret a set 
of intuitions stemming from our (a posteriori) experience of some empirical object(s) as if they 
were “contained in” the concept of an idea whose object lies beyond all possible experience. Had 
Kant recognized that this analogical containment makes the products of the imagination’s 
hypothetical employment analytic a posteriori, his appeal to beauty as a bridge between freedom 
and nature in the third Critique, as well as his use of very similar logic in his discussion of religious 
symbolism (see note 13), would have been much easier to grasp. 
 
4. Naming, Imagining, and The Power of Belief in Twentieth-Century Philosophy 
 Rather than tracing other aspects of Kant’s system that can be interpreted as defending truth-
claims of an analytic a posteriori type, I shall turn my attention now to the various ways this 
epistemological classification can be found operating in twentieth-century philosophy. We have 
already seen (in §2) that several abortive attempts were made, during the third quarter of the 
twentieth century, to rescue analytic aposteriority from oblivion. While none of those succeeded in 
sparking renewed interest, and even my own effort to show that the classification has a place (both 
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in Kant’s system and in philosophy as a whole) has not prompted a flood of responses,14 some 
influential advances that have been made in twentieth-century philosophy can be regarded as 
relating to just this type of truth-claim. In this concluding section I shall therefore examine several 
examples of the latter, before reflecting briefly on two more recent attempts and on the potential for 
future development. 
Foremost among these new developments are the revolutionary insights about the nature of 
“designation” (i.e., fixing a reference) in general and of naming in particular, elaborated in Saul 
Kripke’s influential book, Naming and Necessity [5]. He convincingly defends the existence of two 
previously neglected classifications of truth, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori 
(NN 38), based on considerations revolving around the process of naming and the discovery of new 
facts about the objects so named. Two of his most widely discussed examples, “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” (140) and the designation of a meter as being rigidly fixed by reference to the length 
of a specific stick in Paris (54), illustrate these two unusual epistemological and (as Kripke claims 
[e.g., 35]) metaphysical classifications. As I argued in detail 25 years ago (in “APK”), the 
conclusions Kripke reaches are largely correct, but his assumption about how they require a 
revision of Kant’s epistemological framework is seriously flawed. His error on the latter is rooted in 
the fact that Kripke adopts definitions of his key terms (especially “necessary” vs. “contingent”, but 
also “a priori” vs. “a posteriori” and “analytic” vs. “synthetic”) that were commonplace among 
analytic philosophers of his day, but differ in significant ways from Kant’s own definitions of the 
same terms. Once the differences in definitions are accounted for and appropriate translations are 
made, Kripke’s insights turn out to be entirely consistent with Kant’s epistemological framework – 
provided we extend Kant’s framework to include the analytic a posteriori, as proposed in §3. 
In a nutshell, Kant’s framework (as summarized in §1) takes analyticity-syntheticity and 
apriority-aposteriority to be the fundamental distinctions, and interprets necessity-contingency as a 
subordinate classification that has applications of different types for different classifications of 
truth. By contrast, Kripke takes necessity-contingency and apriority-aposteriority as basic and 
interprets analyticity-syntheticity in terms of these classes. In order to translate Kripke’s 
conclusions into Kant’s framework, we must in most cases read Kripke’s “necessity”/“contingency” 
as referring to one aspect of what Kant would call “apriority”/“aposteriority”, respectively, and his 
“apriority”/“aposteriority” as equivalent to Kant’s “analyticity”/”syntheticity. Even though Kripke’s 
official definition of “analytic” makes analytic aposteriority impossible, he comes very close at one 
point to acknowledging a role for what would be equivalent to this classification, given his own 
definitions. As noted in “APK” 270n. 
Kripke’s framework disallows the analytic a posteriori by definition, since “analytic” is 
stipulated to mean that which is “both necessary and a priori” (NN, 39). He admits at one 
point, however, that his definition of analyticity may be too strict, in which case something 
very much like the analytic a posteriori is suggested: “If statements whose a priori truth is 
known via the fixing of a reference are counted as analytic, then some analytic truths are 
contingent” (NN, 122n, emphasis added). 
Applying the proposed mapping of Kripke’s terminology onto Kant’s, I argued (in “APK” 264, 
268-269) that propositions such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” are not necessary a posteriori (on 
Kant’s terms) but are either synthetic a posteriori (if the context concerns the empirical assertion 
that two apparently very different observed objects are, in fact, the same object) or analytic a priori 
(if one is attending to the logical meaning of the two names, understood as both referring to the 
planet Venus). Similarly, I argued (in “APK” 265,269-270) that Kripke’s demonstration that 
propositions rigidly designating a referent are contingent a priori would, according to Kant’s 
framework, amount to a proof that we are using an analytic a posteriori proposition every time we 
designate in this manner—a feature that is most obvious when we name someone (or something) for 
the first time. 
 Without going into further detail on Kripke’s revolution—the reader interested in its 
relevance to my defense of analytic aposteriority should consult “APK”—let us note that his 
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genuine advance on Kant was to demonstrate the crucial difference between naming an object and 
defining a term (“APK” 171): 
To name requires that we adopt a practical perspective, according to which we act “as if” 
(or stipulate that) a certain object is to be rigidly designated by a certain word. That is, we 
subsume an object as experienced (a posteriori) under a given concept (analytically). To 
define, by contrast, requires that we adopt a logical perspective, according to which we 
devote all our attention to accumulating a set of properties which describe a concept 
uniquely. That is, we subsume a set of general characteristics (a priori) under a given 
concept (analytically). 
What I added to that revolution, in “APK”, was the proposal that Kant’s (or for that matter, 
Kripke’s) framework for classifying types of truth should be regarded not as establishing fixed 
categories, but as delineating different contexts of understanding a given proposition. In other 
words, one and the same proposition (such as “fire is hot”) might function in an analytic a posteriori 
way in one context (e.g., when expressing one’s first discovery that fire is hot), in a synthetic a 
posteriori way in another context (e.g., when describing one’s experience of a hot fire to others who 
know already that fire is hot), and in an analytic a priori way in yet another context (e.g., when 
talking about the meaning of the relevant words). That theory (or something like it) provides the 
most effective response both to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, as well as to 
the various doubts that have been expressed regarding the usefulness of the distinction between a 
priori and a posteriori (see reference 7 and note 5). 
 A decade after “APK” appeared, Andrew Cutrofello published an entire book, Imagining 
Otherwise, explicitly basing his main argument on the proposal that analytic aposteriority 
constitutes a legitimate epistemological classification.
15
 Using Kant’s transcendental philosophy as 
a sounding board, he presents a “metapsychology” focused on Freudian psychoanalysis in the wake 
of Lacan. Rather than affirming a perspectival interpretation of Kant’s framework that has room for 
all four classifications, however, Cutrofello treats the analytic a posteriori and the synthetic a priori 
as mutually exclusive, so that one must choose either Kant and the synthetic apriority of 
transcendental philosophy or Freud and the analytic aposteriority of “metapsychological epoché” 
(IO 3). When the latter option is carried to its completion in the spirit of Hume
16
 and various 
postmodern theorists, what emerges closely resembles the structure of Kant’s first Critique—IO has 
sections detailing the Aesthetics, Logics, Principles, Paralogisms, Antinomies, Ideals, and Ethics of 
the unconscious—yet its content consists of an innovative phenomenology of neurosis, perversion, 
and psychosis. Just as Kant’s emphasis on the importance of synthetic apriority leads him (almost 
neurotically
17) to impose what amounts to a “taboo against thinking the analytic a posteriori” (141), 
Cutrofello reads Freud’s “Kantian inheritance” as “a systematic challenge to Kant’s thesis 
concerning the synthetic a priori” (8-9). 
While the details of Cutrofello’s application of analytic aposteriority are intriguing, to say 
the least, what matters most for our purposes is that Cutrofello has explicitly taken on the challenge 
of treating this almost forgotten classification with the seriousness it deserves. Indeed, the 
importance of his study is not so much the specific details of his postmodern critique (or 
[psycho]analysis) of Kant, as the general fact that he takes as his philosophical backdrop the 
Continental tradition, encompassing the trajectory from phenomenology and existentialism to 
deconstructionism and critical theory. As such, his book makes an ideal contrast to Kripke’s, aptly 
illustrating the relevance of analytic aposteriority to both major twentieth-century philosophical 
traditions. What is ironic about Cutrofello’s approach is that its either-or strategy lends itself to a 
psychoanalytic diagnosis of irrational exclusivism not unlike the one he levels against Kant. As a 
result, he ends up offering little more insight than Kant does into the deep epistemological 
distinction between the synthetic a priori and the analytic a posteriori. By contrast, adopting a 
perspectival strategy, whereby all four classifications are allowed their proper domains of 
application, has the potential to lead us beyond the kind of us-and-them labeling that tends to plague 
any form of exclusivism. 
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 Although I have given but two examples of twentieth-century philosophers who have 
affirmed the legitimacy of the analytic a posteriori (one implicitly, the other explicitly), many other 
potential applications could be cited. Using the foregoing examples as inspiration, let me therefore 
conclude by sketching a few of the other areas where twentieth-century philosophy can be fruitfully 
interpreted as following this line of development. I shall follow the suggestion offered in an essay 
on the lasting influence of Kant and Kierkegaard (see note 3), where I argued that the impact of 
these two philosophers on the twentieth century can best be understood in terms of the interplay 
between synthetic apriority and analytic aposteriority. That is, I firmly reject Cutrofello’s 
assumption that these two classifications are somehow locked in competition, forcing us to choose 
one or the other.
18
 For Kant’s explicit aim, as he tells us in CPR Bxxx, was not only “to annul 
knowledge” of metaphysical ideas (via the synthetic a priori), but also “to make room for faith” in 
those same ideas (via the analytic a posteriori).
19
 Along these lines, my suggestion in “PRKK” 256-
258 was that the analytic a posteriori shows itself most notably in areas of human experience 
characterized by the power of belief. 
The nature and function of belief, as opposed to knowledge, was the focus of vast amounts 
of attention by analytic philosophers in the twentieth century. Perhaps this emphasis was nowhere 
manifested more powerfully than in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, where the whole 
strategy of analyzing ordinary language usage could be fruitfully interpreted in terms of attending to 
the way our experiences of the world (a posteriori) are already contained (analytically) in the 
meanings of key philosophical words. What the later Wittgenstein accomplished, as a much more 
significant advance on Kant than that of the early Wittgenstein (whose Tractatus focuses more on 
the interplay between analytic apriority and synthetic aposteriority), was to recognize the open-
endedness of human language as the locus of metaphysical power—even if that power is all-too-
often misused by philosophers to create problems that are not genuine. Wittgenstein’s decision to 
ground his arguments in the metaphor of a “language game” might seem unfortunate; yet this very 
metaphor can be interpreted, from what I have called Kant’s hypothetical perspective (with its 
inevitable outworking in the practical standpoint), as the foundation for the analytic aposteriority of 
his whole approach: our linguistic structures are to be viewed analytically, with attention focused on 
the meanings contained within them, yet that very containment is to be explained by examining the 
experienced reality of the “game” that forms the context of their usage. 
 Tracing the Continental tradition back to its earliest roots in Husserl’s Logical Investigations 
and Heidegger’s Being and Time, we can detect similar potential applications for a perspectival 
understanding of analytic aposteriority. Cutrofello’s appeal (though only in passing) to the concept 
of epoché (see IO 3)—what Husserl also called “bracketing”—suggests the significance of this 
notion to phenomenology; as a further development of (and complement to) Kantian transcendental 
reflection, it can be interpreted as a call to view the nature of reality in the open-ended terms of 
analytic aposteriority. Similarly, the role of intentionality and imagination in demarcating a 
“horizon” of understanding, from which context each person sets out to interpret the world, can best 
be understood as a conceptually-grounded power (hence, analytic) that encompasses within it each 
experience a person calls his or her own (hence, a posteriori).
20
 Admittedly, these are only hints as 
to how one might proceed in relating this much-maligned epistemological classification to the 
developments of twentieth-century philosophy; but in a nutshell, much of the emphasis of both 
analytic and Continental philosophers during the past century has been on unveiling the depths of 
experienced reality in ways that go beyond what Kant called “empirical knowledge”, so my point 
here is merely that a clearer awareness of the status of such post-empirical knowing (as analytic a 
posteriori) would provide a fruitful way of understanding how these developments relate to other, 
more time-honored aspects of human knowing. 
 Finally, although my main focus in this paper has been on the twentieth century, it is worth 
mentioning that two (admittedly, rather meager) attempts have been made, during the first decade of 
this century (both in 2003), to restore respectability to the analytic a posteriori. Unfortunately, 
neither of them mentioned any of the previous attempts, discussed above, so it is not surprising that 





[3], before relating it (like Cutrofello) to a field outside of 
philosophy, starts with a single paragraph on the analytic a posteriori, portraying it (very much 
along the lines suggested in “APK”) in terms of “the ways in which we come to learn language.”21 
Unfortunately, having presented it as a valid classification, he makes no significant application of it 
in his essay. 
 Second and more significantly, Åsa Maria Wikforss devotes an entire article to assessing 
analytic aposteriority [8],
22
 concluding that it is not plausible to expect analyticity and aposteriority 
to be rendered consistent in the same way Kripke reconciled necessity and aposteriority. Appealing 
primarily to Tyler Burge (whose “externalism” never explicitly affirms the analytic a posteriori, but 
does seem to hint at it), Wikforss considers whether Burge’s approach could do for analyticity what 
Kripke did for necessity—i.e., make it a posteriori by locating necessity in objects (e.g., Hesperus 
and Phosphorus) rather than in descriptions. The problem, she claims, is that “the epistemic aspect 
is not so easily dismissed” in the case of analyticity.23 This argument seems persuasive if we accept 
the same understanding of the basic terms that Kripke, Wikforss, and the analytic tradition in 
general adopt. My response to Wikforss, however, can be brief for precisely that reason: given the 
redefinition of Kant’s key terms that has become commonplace in the literature, the project of 
resurrecting the analytic a posteriori is, indeed, hopeless. But if we recover the original meanings 
Kant assigned to the key terms, as I suggested in “APK”, then Wikforss’ argument becomes a non 
sequitur: if Kripke’s insights regarding the contingent a priori (see note 23) amount to an 
affirmation of analytic aposteriority on Kant’s terms, then one who accepts those insights as valid 
cannot also deny the importance of the latter classification. 
Although in this section I have only scratched the surface of its possible applications, the 
foregoing evidence should be sufficient to demonstrate the great importance of analytic 
aposteriority for contemporary philosophy. Were we to extend this study beyond philosophy proper, 
to areas of application such as philosophy of science, the relevance of the analytic a posteriori 
would prove to be even more relevant; for it would enable us to understand how Kant can claim at 
one and the same time that knowledge of the thing in itself is impossible (from the perspective of 
synthetic apriority) and yet to allow that scientists engaged in studying aspects of the world that 
transcend human observation (the level of the synthetic a posteriori) may in some sense be 
obtaining knowledge of the thing in itself (understood as analytic a posteriori).
24
 I have elsewhere 
summarized this deep compatibility between synthetic apriority and analytic aposteriority in words 
that intentionally allude to Owen Barfield’s classic work [6]: 
Classifying our hypothetical beliefs about the world [as analytic a posteriori] can do the 
crucial work of saving the appearances, both from being proudly mistaken for ultimate 
reality and from being discarded as mere appearances. The synthetic a priori class of 
knowledge occupied most of Kant’s attention; for he argued that all legitimate 
transcendental knowledge is of this type. This is why he said the question “How are 
synthetic judgments a priori possible?” is the central question of all Critical philosophy. 
Kant fully recognized that Critical philosophy is a propaedeutic to metaphysics as such. What he 
did not recognize is that, in order to construct an actual system of metaphysics (even one that 
conforms to the educative principles laid down in the three Critiques), we must go beyond the 
synthetic a priori and immerse our inquiry in precisely the opposite ground. The extent to which 
twentieth-century philosophers recognized this need and have made genuine progress (often 
rejecting the letter of the Kantian law, yet if I am correct, following its spirit even more than Kant 
himself did) is the extent to which they have opened themselves up to that level of the human 
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